The maintenance of price stability is widely recognised as the primary goal of modern monetary policy, and the management of private sector in ‡ation expectations has become an essential channel through which this goal is achieved. This evaluation aims to improve the understanding of how the sensitivity of private sector in ‡ation expectations to macroeconomic surprises in South Africa compares internationally, as this provides an indication of the contribution of monetary policy in South Africa to anchoring in ‡ation expectations. If a central bank is credible, the …nancial markets should react less sensitively to macroeconomics surprises, because they trust the central bank to manage these incidents and achieve the objectives they communicated over the medium to long term. In this paper, the methodology of Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is adopted in order to measure the sensitivity of South African in ‡ation expectations to surprises. A comparison of South Africa's results with those of countries in the original studies supports the contention that the SARB (South African Reserve Bank) has encouraged private sector in ‡ation expectations to be relatively insensitive to macroeconomic surprises, and it o¤ers further support to the argument that the in ‡ation targeting framework facilitates the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations.
Section 2 provides a theoretical exploration of modern monetary policy and section 3 reviews the available evidence regarding the transparency and credibility of South African monetary policy. The methodology of Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is adopted in section 4 in order to measure the sensitivity of South Africa's in ‡ation expectations to'surprises'.A comparison of the South African results with those of countries in the original studies supports the contention that the SARB has anchored in ‡ation expectations relatively well and that in ‡ation targeting o¤ers a useful framework for the management of private sector expectations.
Modern Monetary Policy
It seems appropriate to base any critical evaluation of monetary policy operation in South Africa, or proposal for its improvement, on a sound understanding of the objectives and challenges facing contemporary monetary policy. Price stability has become widely accepted as the primary goal of monetary policy 1 . Monetarists emphasise the long-term e¤ects of monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability, with Friedman (1948 Friedman ( , 1953 calling attention to the lags between the implementation of monetary policy and its e¤ects in the real world. This focus on the long term naturally drew attention to the role of expectations and required that purposeful monetary policy be forwardlooking.
If it is recognised that economic policy is not a once-o¤, static decision, there needs to be a conscious awareness of the implications of applying policy in a dynamic setting. Optimal control theory has been widely used for dynamic problems, including policy decisions. If the private sector is a passive participant, the benevolent policy maker could maximise a social outcome by making an optimal decision, based on the state of the economy at the time and the historical development of policy up to that point.
In practice, policy decisions are complicated by the fact that the setting in which they are typically made is dynamic in terms of the interaction between thinking agents over time. Not only do policy makers assess the environment and make decisions they deem best, but the public also acts in its own best interests. Monetary policy models have largely been based on the assumption that decision makers form expectations in a 'rational'way. This calls attention to the strategic nature of the interaction. Through their economic decisions, the private sector and monetary authorities impact on one another's decisions. These ideas have had substantial implications for policy, guided by compelling developments in the theory 2 . In an evaluation of four monetary regimes, Mishkin (1999) identi…es the use of a nominal anchor as a fundamental commonality. He narrowly describes a nominal anchor as 'a constraint on the value of domestic money'and more broadly 'a constraint on discretionary policy '(1999: 1) . He concludes that transparency and accountability are essential to this end, regardless of the speci…c strategy adopted by the country. By maintaining transparency, central banks are allowing themselves to be held accountable and limiting their own discretion.
In conclusion, transparency, accountability, credibility, and commitment to rules-based policies have become central to the implementation of modern monetary policy. When policy makers commit themselves to greater transparency and accountability in a way that is believable, they give their policy credibility. If their commitment to low in ‡ation is regarded as trustworthy, the markets should believe that in ‡ationary spikes are transitory. Their in ‡ation expectations of the longer-term future would remain low; therefore, they would not adjust their market decisions in a way that adds upward in ‡ationary pressure. This would allow the monetary authority to use less aggressive adjustments to their instrument in order to maintain price stability, and the cost of tighter monetary policy on output (the sacri…ce ratio) would be lower.
Review of the evidence: Transparency and Credibility of South African Monetary Policy
Current discussion surrounding in ‡ation expectations and the degree to which the SARB is e¤ectively managing in ‡ation expectations in South Africa is dominated by analyses of macroeconomic trends, in ‡ation expectation surveys, and 'break-even'rates (the di¤erence between nominal and in ‡ation-indexed bonds of similar maturity -see Reid (2008) , for a more comprehensive discussion of these. However, none of the above measures directly examines the relationship between the changes in the monetary policy instrument and other market interest rates. Ballim and Moolman (2005) contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of changes in the repo rate on a range of …nancial market instruments in order to capture the response of interest rates at di¤erent horizons. These include forward rate agreements (FRAs) with maturities of less than a year and government bonds with longer maturities. Using a variety of empirical tests, they …nd strong correlations (diminishing with longer horizons) between movements in the repo rate and short-term interest rates, and they …nd that the majority of the market adjustment occurs before the decision is announced, suggesting that markets are anticipating changes in the repo rate.
Aron and Muellbauer (2006) extend the former study by using FRAs with di¤erent dimensions to identify the expectations of the markets regarding following policy decisions more clearly. However, their results are similar to those of Ballim and Moolman (2005) .
These two studies begin to empirically scrutinise the causal relationship between monetary policy and market interest rates. Aron and Muellbauer (2006) still question the strong policy conclusions drawn by Ballim and Moolman and propose that a comparison of the magnitudes of the responses with those of another country would provide more indication of the room for improvement.
To avoid measurement error, it is also preferable to use the 'surprise'(the di¤erence between the forecasted value and the actual value realised) of the market after the announcement of a monetary policy decision as the independent variable, rather than simply to use the change in the repo rate. The markets may be surprised by the failure of the SARB to adjust the repo rate, or conversely, a change in the policy rate may be entirely anticipated. The surprise component provides a more precise measure of the new information presented to the market, to be considered when pricing instruments. These issues will be addressed by the empirical study in the following section.
The Sensitivity of In ‡ation Expectations to ' Surprises'in South Africa
Recent work in a series of papers beginning with Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) , have o¤ered exciting new insights. They investigated the impact of new information (macroeconomic data and monetary policy 'surprises') on short-and long-term interest rates (the term structure of the interest rate). Using advances in the literature regarding how to measure the market's expectations of interest rates and in ‡ation in a period far into the future, Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) …nd that long-term expectations (as captured by the long-term in ‡ation compensation rates) in the US are not as well anchored 3 as one might have expected. Subsequent research found that long-term in ‡ation expectations in the US and in pre-1997 UK (before the Bank of England (BoE) gained independence 4 ) were far more sensitive to surprise information than those of Sweden and post-1997 UK (Gurkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006) . They interpreted this as evidence that anchoring long-term in ‡ation expectations was enhanced through in ‡ation targeting.
These …ndings were reinforced through a study by Mauricio Larrain (2005) from the Central Bank of Chile, who examined the e¤ect of monetary policy surprises on the term structure of interest rates in Chile. He found that in ‡ation expectations in Chile (an emerging market) compared favourably with those of the US. The study by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson has also been extended to test its applicability to Canada and Chile (Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder and Swanson, 2005). The results bolstered those of the original study, with the forward in ‡ation compensation (di¤erence between the forward rates of nominal and real bonds) of Canada and Chile not showing signi…cant responses to domestic macroeconomic data and monetary policy surprises. An interesting peculiarity of this article is that the Canadian far-ahead interest rates did show a degree of sensitivity to news from the US, although it was still less than the response of the US.
That in ‡ation-targeting central banks are more credible than the Federal Reserve Bank would be an unpersuasive argument. It is more likely that the systematic implementation and communication of monetary policy in the in ‡ation targeting countries reduces the uncertainty experienced by …nancial markets in these countries. If a central bank were more transparent about its plans for future policy, it would potentially be able to shape market expectations more directly and improve coordination.
In this section, the methodology of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is applied in order to more directly evaluate the link between monetary policy and the …nancial markets in South Africa. It sheds light on the degree to which the international …ndings of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) are applicable to South Africa, and investigates how well in ‡ation expectations have been anchored in South Africa over the past …ve years, relative to countries discussed in other articles above.
Data and Methodology
As with many studies performed in less developed countries, the availability of data, especially in the form required, was a challenge. 5 Following the model of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a), variables were created to capture the 'surprise'experienced by the markets, following a number of macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy decisions; and the variable 'forward in ‡ation compensation'was created as a measure of the in ‡ation expectations of the markets.
This enables an estimate of the impact of the surprises on the in ‡ation expectations of the market during this period, using the following regression:
The change in the forward in ‡ation compensation on day t ( F IC t ) was regressed on the surprise components of the macroeconomic announcements on the corresponding day t. CPIX, GDP, CA and PPI are the surprise components of the consumer price index, gross domestic product, current account and producer price index data releases respectively; and REPO is the surprise component of the monetary policy decision regarding the setting of the repo rate. " t represents the factors that in ‡uence forward in ‡ation compensation other than regressors used. The data set consists of daily observations of the changes in the in ‡ation compensation on the day of each announcement. Only days on which an announcement was made are included, and usually only one announcement took place each date, so on any particular day, only one non-zero surprise was measured. The regression results can be interpreted as the extent to which in ‡ation compensation responds (on average) to the surprise components of macroeconomic announcements over the sample period (May 2002 -March 2007).
Macroeconomic surprises
The 'surprise' component of the macroeconomic data announcements was isolated to re ‡ect the fact that the balance of the movement of the macroeconomic data is not 'news' to them and will therefore not be responsible for the movements of the interest rates. Abrupt movements of the interest rate shortly after the announcement would re ‡ect the extent to which they misjudged the actual outcome. This is the extent to which the markets have received new information which has not yet been re ‡ected in the pricing. To capture the surprise of the markets at the release of macroeconomic data, Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005) calculated the di¤erence between the actual data released and the median forecast of a panel of professional forecasters, polled shortly before that data release.
surprise=actual release-median forecast (2)
For the purposes of this study of the South African situation, the macroeconomic variables considered were CPIX, PPI, GDP and CA. These were selected due to the availability of survey data and their high degree of relevance to in ‡ation expectations.
With regard to the actual data releases, Van Walbeeck (2006) recently expressed concern regarding the size of the o¢ cial revisions to South African national accounts data, and the impact of these on econometric studies using this data. He found that the o¢ cial …gures were often adjusted substantially as more accurate information became available to the statistical authorities. The implication for the data set used in this study is that the surprise experienced by the market following a data release may be dispersed over time, as the o¢ cial …gures are revised. On consideration, …rst-release data was used, because, as Van Walbeeck (2006) pointed out, the …rst release receives the most attention.
A series of consensus forecasts were required to capture the expectations of the markets regarding the relevant macroeconomic variables. The median of forecasts from the panel of economists was used (rather than the mean) in order to limit the in ‡uence of changes in composition of the panel, and to minimise the e¤ect of outliers.
The precise publication dates of the data were necessary to match the forecast and actual data releases accurately, and then to match these surprise components with the movement in the forward in ‡ation compensation on the day of each 'surprise'.
CPIX:
The …rst releases of CPIX were collected from consecutive issues of the SARB Quarterly Bulletin (2002 -2007) by collecting only the last …gures, which had not yet been revised, from each issue. Publication dates were provided by Stats SA and were compared with media reports, where available (Business Day -various issues, 2002 -2007), to con…rm that there were no discrepancies due to delayed data releases.
To capture the market's expectations of the CPIX, the Reuters 'Econometer' 6 was considered …rst, as it is a comprehensive and reputable survey that has been conducted since October 1999. Unfortunately, although the economists are polled monthly, they forecast for the end of the quarter; therefore, matching the CPIX data releases (released monthly) with the forecast becomes a bit contrived 7 . The Beeld newspaper's 'economist of the year' competition posed the same problem. This increases the potential for measurement error and simultaneity. Alternatively, a series of surveys conducted by Bloomberg (2002 Bloomberg ( -2007 within the week leading up to the data release was used for 6 Forecasts of a panel of professional economists. 7 Although Reuters do survey the market's expectations of some data releases for a shorter horizon, these were not available prior to the past two years. 5 the forecast of CPIX. This allowed the surprise resulting from each individual release to be captured more accurately. The dates on which the SARB Quarterly Bulletins were released by the Reserve Bank, which would be the …rst public release of the current account data, was provided by the SARB 8 . Bloomberg did not provide forecasts of the current account releases the week before the data release. Instead, the Reuters Econometer was used, but this was not as much of a problem as for the CPIX, as the actual current account data is only released once per quarter. As described above, the Reuters panel forecasts their expectation monthly for the end of the quarter; therefore, there are three forecasts for each quarter. The last forecast of the three before the release of the actual current account data (here the panel forecasts for the end of the month) was used in an attempt to capture the market's expectation of the current account balance as close to the data release as possible.
Figure IV
In order to ensure comparability of the macroeconomic 'surprises' and ease interpretation, the di¤erent macroeconomic surprises were normalised, by dividing each series by its standard error (Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson, 2005a ). The coe¢ cient on each macroeconomic surprise in the regression should be interpreted as the variation in the forward in ‡ation compensation caused by a 1 standard deviation of the surprise.
Monetary policy surprises
The surprise component for monetary policy was calculated using market data rather than the surveys, as this is available at a much higher frequency and is of a higher quality. The change in the three-month Bankers Acceptance (BA) Rate (the SARB, 2007) on the day after the monetary policy committee (MPC) makes its statement 9 was used as a proxy for this surprise component 10 . The MPC announcement is made at 2pm, whereas the BA rate is set by the banks at midday; therefore, the BA rate would only re ‡ect any surprise experienced by the markets the following day.
The monetary policy surprise series was not normalised, and the coe¢ cient on repo is interpretable as the basis point variation in the forward interest rate, due to a basis point variation in the monetary policy surprise variable. Bear in mind that the MPC statement communicates the decision of the monetary policy committee regarding the present changes in the policy instrument, but it may also provide an indication of the possible future policy stance of the committee. 
Measurement of in ‡ation expectations
Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) isolated the in ‡ation expectations of the market by …nding the forward in ‡ation compensation 11 , which is the di¤erence between nominal and real forward interest rates. Forward rate agreements, which are traded in the markets, are only available with horizons of up to one year, whereas longer horizons are more appropriate for this study. However, yield, spot and forward rate curves all present the same underlying term structure information in di¤erent ways, so nominal and real implied forward rates could be calculated using bond data (Coleman, 1998) . Implied forward rates and in ‡ation compensation calculated for South Africa in a previous paper (Reid, 2008) According to the Fisher equation, the short-term nominal interest rate can be decomposed into the real interest rate and in ‡ation expectations (Walsh, 2003) :
where i t = nominal interest rate r t = real interest rate t = in ‡ation expectations Svensson (1994) proposed the use of forward interest rates for analysing monetary policy, because a forward interest rate is related to an ordinary yield curve in the same manner as average and marginal cost curves are related. Forward rates at a long-term horizon, show the expected shortterm interest rates at that horizon. Relying on the Fisher equation, forward in ‡ation compensation can be presented as the di¤erence between nominal and real forward rates:
Fwd in ‡ation compensation(9-10)=nom fwd rate(9-10)-real fwd rate(9-10)
In ‡ation compensation is, however, an imprecise measure of in ‡ation expectations, because according to the asset pricing model, a term for the risk premium should be added to the Fisher equation (the nominal interest rate should be decomposed into the real interest rate, expected in ‡a-tion, and the risk premium).
Both Sack (2002) and Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) acknowledge that in ‡ation compensation does not capture expected in ‡ation precisely, and they do not lightly disregard the in ‡uence of risk premia, but they insist that these factors do not discredit their results. If the variations in the risk premia over time are at lower frequencies than the daily variations in forward in ‡ation compensation (the dependent variable), the risk premia should not have much in ‡uence on the coe¢ cient estimates (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006) . Even if the premia decrease substantially over time, their movement in one day will be very small.
Regression Results
The original studies (Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson, 2005 , and Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006) use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models as benchmarks, from which they emphasise two important observations. Firstly, in agreement with a variety of macroeconomic models, the DSGE models show that within …ve (or at least ten) years, the short-term interest rates return to their steady state. Secondly, if the short-term interest rate is approximately an average of all short-term interest rates over the life of the bond, then it follows that this long-term interest rate will move when economic news is released, as the shorter-term interest rates will respond. However, the forward rate at a long horizon (between years four and …ve, or nine and ten in this case) should not respond to economic news in the present time period if in ‡ation expectations are well anchored and transitory responses to shocks disappear before the long-term horizon is reached 12 . If the forward interest rates at the long horizons do respond, it suggests that there is pass-through of the economic shock to the in ‡ation expectations.
Over the sample period of this study, South Africa was an in ‡ation targeter, and the one-year forward in ‡ation compensations -ending in …ve and ten year's time -are expected to be well anchored. Using the variables created above, this was investigated by regressing the nominal spot rate and forward in ‡ation compensation rates on the surprise variables, using the method of ordinary least squares adopted by Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson.
The surprise components of the macroeconomic data and monetary policy announcements are listed vertically, in rows, in Table I below. The regression results reporting the sensitivity of the one-year spot to these surprise components are presented in the …rst column, and the sensitivity of the one-year forward in ‡ation compensation ending in one year's time is presented in column two of Table I . Column one has two highly signi…cant coe¢ cients and the R 2 of 9.2% suggests that these variables do explain a portion (9.2%) of the variation in the nominal rate. The probability of the F statistic (0.7%) indicates that the hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero can be rejected even at the 1% level of signi…cance. Similarly, column two has three signi…cant coe¢ cients, an R 2 of 8.8% and the probability of the F statistic of 1%. Although the R 2 of these two regressions shows that a substantial amount of the variation in the nominal rate and the in ‡ation compensation ending in one year's time is not explained by the surprise variables included in the regressions, the signi…cant variables and highly signi…cant F statistic show that the regression variables do contain some information relevant for the movement of short-term interest rates. These statistics are also comparable to the international results in the original studies, summarised in column one of Table  II . The question is whether this information passes through to long-term in ‡ation expectations.
Columns three and four, analysing the sensitivity of the one-year forward in ‡ation compensation ending in …ve and ten year's time to the surprise components, attempts to answer this question. The coe¢ cients get progressively less signi…cant, while the R 2 decreases and the F-statistic increases. The results of in ‡ation compensation at the ten-year horizon are especially strong. All the coe¢ cients are insigni…cant, the R 2 suggests that only 0.7% of the variation in the in ‡ation compensation can be explained by the surprises, and the probability of the F statistic (0.948) suggests that the hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected. The crucial point is how the statistics have changed. For example, the R 2 of 0.7% at the ten-year horizon is less than one thirteenth (7.6%) of the size of the R 2 of the one-year in ‡ation compensation ending in ten year's time. 13 , which are summarised in Table II below. Notice that all these countries adopt the in ‡ation targeting framework. Table II Comparing the results for the nominal spot rate and the one-year in ‡ation compensation ending in ten year's time, the coe¢ cients for the surprise variables in Sweden and the UK (post-central bank independence) become substantially less signi…cant. The R 2 decreased from 7% to 1% in Sweden and from 24% to 3% in the UK after BoE independence. The Chilean example as an emerging market in ‡ation targeter reinforces these results.
It is illuminating to compare the above with the results for the US and the UK (pre-central bank independence). The decrease in the R 2 for the US is proportionately much smaller and, although the signi…cance of the coe¢ cients decrease, …ve of the eleven coe¢ cients are still signi…cant at the ten-year horizon. The results are even stronger for the UK before central bank independence, with the R 2 only decreasing from 35% to 21% and clearly re ‡ecting a strong pass-through from economic shock to in ‡ation expectations at the long horizon. Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) suggest that these results support the contention that the in ‡ation targeting framework of Sweden and the UK, after central bank independence, result in a better anchoring of in ‡ation expectations than the US (as a non in ‡ation targeter) and the UK before central bank independence.
Conclusion
It is important to realise that, although some of the most successful and in ‡uential central banks have chosen not to adopt in ‡ation targeting, their execution of monetary policy is converging with that of the in ‡ation targeting central banks (King, 2004) . Both groups recognise the strategic nature of monetary policy and use communication and transparency extensively in order to in ‡uence expectations and increase the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. The methodology of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005) was applied to South African data in this paper and the results were encouraging. The sensitivity of South African in ‡ation expectations for the period under review is comparable with in ‡ation targeting countries analysed in international studies, suggesting that in ‡ation targeting is o¤ering a useful framework for monetary authorities in South Africa to communicate with the public and thereby anchor in ‡ation expectations. However, credibility building is not a once-o¤ exercise. The SARB should continually strive to promote coordination with the …nancial markets through transparent and predictable monetary policy. The numbers in the columns are the coefficient values and those in brackets are the corresponding standard errors (heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were used). The coefficient on each of the macroeconomic surprises should be interpreted as the variation in the forward inflation compensation caused by a 1 standard deviation of the surprise. The coefficient on REPO is interpretable as the basis point variation in the forward interest rate due to the variation in the monetary policy surprise variable, measured in basis points. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The probably value of the F statistic represents the probability that all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Source: Data from the SARB.
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